A Surface Warship Commanding Officer’s
Leadership and Management Technique
Based on Mission-Oriented Goals and Objectives
by
Captain John Frank Gamboa, U.S. Navy (Retired)
June 2018
Part I
INTRODUCTION
America’s national and international security interests and issues are the primary basis for our armed forces’ forward operational deployments, especially the Navy’s numbered fleet task forces. Our country’s powerful fleet warships operate in the vast Pacific Ocean Areas, Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and lots of other blue water. Wherever they are directed to operate, America’s naval task forces define her sea power and her control of the seas.
Within these task forces the overriding concern is combat readiness. The Commanding Officers (CO) of task force surface warships must be ready to smartly respond to tasking from higher authority. Top-level systems readiness and a high state of Ship’s Company team and individual training are the core of a warship’s readiness. But the most critical factor in achieving and sustaining a warship’s readiness is the quality of the CO’s leadership and management.
I graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in the Class of 1958 and was commissioned as a Line Ensign. Thanks to the academy’s superb education and training curriculum, I enjoyed a most interesting and challenging Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) career that included command of an LSD, an LPD, a 7-warship amphibious squadron and a naval communications station.
In June 2011, I published ¡El Capitán! The Making of an American Naval Officer (www.frankgamboa.com). The memoir portrays my SWO career and my personal history as a California-born first-generation Mexican American.
I’ve also had a life-time interest in organizational development (OD). I read private-sector management journals and learned about corporations’ management by goals and objectives. In my 3 sea commands and 1 ashore, my driving interest was to maximize the effectiveness in each command.
To create A Surface Warship Commanding Officer’s Leadership and Management Technique Based on Mission-Oriented Goals and Objectives (LMGO) and this corresponding blog article, I looked back through the filters of time, distance and memory and reflected on my 17 years of surface warship experience, focusing primarily on my 13 consecutive years in command or xo at sea and shore. This was the genesis of LMGO.
LMGO was created from the experience, knowledge and insight that I obtained in four successful command implementations of MBO principles. Because of the unique circumstances that I inherited in each assumption of command, I tried to respond with the best overall command leadership and management approach with a bias towards using LMGO for greatest effectiveness. With each success I gained confidence that I was on the right track.
My final use of the LMGO technique was to satisfy PHIBRON THREE’S requirements for a ten-month turn around and extended deployment. I considered all facets of MBO; but even then my criteria was to use a good dose of common sense in bringing my 7 commanding officers aboard my new technique.
LMGO’s theoretical basis reflects the works of management guru Peter Drucker, the father of modern corporate management. Drucker’s formulation of his Management by Goals and Objectives (MBO) is in his book The Practice of Management. Part II is a summary of Drucker’s MBO.
INTRODUCTION
America’s national and international security interests and issues are the primary basis for our armed forces’ forward operational deployments, especially the Navy’s numbered fleet task forces. Our country’s powerful fleet warships operate in the vast Pacific Ocean Areas, Atlantic Ocean, Caribbean Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and lots of other blue water. Wherever they are directed to operate, America’s naval task forces define her sea power and her control of the seas.
Within these task forces the overriding concern is combat readiness. The Commanding Officers (CO) of task force surface warships must be ready to smartly respond to tasking from higher authority. Top-level systems readiness and a high state of Ship’s Company team and individual training are the core of a warship’s readiness. But the most critical factor in achieving and sustaining a warship’s readiness is the quality of the CO’s leadership and management.
I graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy in the Class of 1958 and was commissioned as a Line Ensign. Thanks to the academy’s superb education and training curriculum, I enjoyed a most interesting and challenging Surface Warfare Officer (SWO) career that included command of an LSD, an LPD, a 7-warship amphibious squadron and a naval communications station.
In June 2011, I published ¡El Capitán! The Making of an American Naval Officer (www.frankgamboa.com). The memoir portrays my SWO career and my personal history as a California-born first-generation Mexican American.
I’ve also had a life-time interest in organizational development (OD). I read private-sector management journals and learned about corporations’ management by goals and objectives. In my 3 sea commands and 1 ashore, my driving interest was to maximize the effectiveness in each command.
To create A Surface Warship Commanding Officer’s Leadership and Management Technique Based on Mission-Oriented Goals and Objectives (LMGO) and this corresponding blog article, I looked back through the filters of time, distance and memory and reflected on my 17 years of surface warship experience, focusing primarily on my 13 consecutive years in command or xo at sea and shore. This was the genesis of LMGO.
LMGO was created from the experience, knowledge and insight that I obtained in four successful command implementations of MBO principles. Because of the unique circumstances that I inherited in each assumption of command, I tried to respond with the best overall command leadership and management approach with a bias towards using LMGO for greatest effectiveness. With each success I gained confidence that I was on the right track.
My final use of the LMGO technique was to satisfy PHIBRON THREE’S requirements for a ten-month turn around and extended deployment. I considered all facets of MBO; but even then my criteria was to use a good dose of common sense in bringing my 7 commanding officers aboard my new technique.
LMGO’s theoretical basis reflects the works of management guru Peter Drucker, the father of modern corporate management. Drucker’s formulation of his Management by Goals and Objectives (MBO) is in his book The Practice of Management. Part II is a summary of Drucker’s MBO.
PART II
MANAGEMENT BY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES (MBO)
Peter Drucker’s ideas and thoughts revolutionized corporate management in the 20th century. According to Drucker, effectiveness was more important than efficiency and was the foundation of every organization. Through his book The Practice of Management, he developed Management by Objectives (MBO).
MBO deals with a certain type of interaction specific to a manager and his or her employees. It is based on the thinking that various hierarchies within companies need to be integrated. There is a need for commitment, responsibility, maturity and a common challenge.
MBO meets these needs through a process by which the objectives of an organization are agreed to and decided on between the management and the employees. The employees understand what is expected of them and help to set their own individual goals; they strive to attain both their personal goals and the organization’s.
An MBO system calls for each level of managers to identify their goals for every area they are responsible for. These goals are then shared with their individual units. Shared targets (objectives) guide individuals in fulfilling their role. Each level of management in the firm is expected to participate in the process in order to ensure its effective implementation.
Management monitors and evaluates performance, checking progress frequently and over a set period of time. Their focus is on the future rather than on the past. There are external and internal controls in this system and routine assessments. An evaluation is done to understand to what extent the goals have been met.
An important aspect of the MBO approach is the agreement between employees and managers regarding performance which is open to evaluation. The principle is that, when employees are involved with the goal setting and in choosing the course of action, they are more likely to fulfil their responsibilities. There is a link between organizational goals and performance targets/objectives of the employees.
In MBO, goals are expected to be SMART, i.e. Specific; Measurable; Achievable; Realistic, and Time bound.
To create a surface warship leadership and management technique based on mission-oriented goals and objectives, personnel must interpret the foregoing description of MBO by thinking of the corporation’s management personnel in terms of the Navy’s basic warship organization consisting of a CO, XO, department heads, division officers, chief petty officers and leading petty officers in the Ship’s Company. Here are some of the MBO advantages compared to non-MBO management systems:
But there are disadvantages in MBO:
Nonetheless, a well-designed LMGO plan and implementation in a surface warship will maximise the ship’s effectiveness and readiness. The key to success is the CO’s dedicated leadership and creating a professional command climate in the ship.
MANAGEMENT BY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES (MBO)
Peter Drucker’s ideas and thoughts revolutionized corporate management in the 20th century. According to Drucker, effectiveness was more important than efficiency and was the foundation of every organization. Through his book The Practice of Management, he developed Management by Objectives (MBO).
MBO deals with a certain type of interaction specific to a manager and his or her employees. It is based on the thinking that various hierarchies within companies need to be integrated. There is a need for commitment, responsibility, maturity and a common challenge.
MBO meets these needs through a process by which the objectives of an organization are agreed to and decided on between the management and the employees. The employees understand what is expected of them and help to set their own individual goals; they strive to attain both their personal goals and the organization’s.
An MBO system calls for each level of managers to identify their goals for every area they are responsible for. These goals are then shared with their individual units. Shared targets (objectives) guide individuals in fulfilling their role. Each level of management in the firm is expected to participate in the process in order to ensure its effective implementation.
Management monitors and evaluates performance, checking progress frequently and over a set period of time. Their focus is on the future rather than on the past. There are external and internal controls in this system and routine assessments. An evaluation is done to understand to what extent the goals have been met.
An important aspect of the MBO approach is the agreement between employees and managers regarding performance which is open to evaluation. The principle is that, when employees are involved with the goal setting and in choosing the course of action, they are more likely to fulfil their responsibilities. There is a link between organizational goals and performance targets/objectives of the employees.
In MBO, goals are expected to be SMART, i.e. Specific; Measurable; Achievable; Realistic, and Time bound.
To create a surface warship leadership and management technique based on mission-oriented goals and objectives, personnel must interpret the foregoing description of MBO by thinking of the corporation’s management personnel in terms of the Navy’s basic warship organization consisting of a CO, XO, department heads, division officers, chief petty officers and leading petty officers in the Ship’s Company. Here are some of the MBO advantages compared to non-MBO management systems:
- There is participation in setting of goals, deciding the course of action and in decision making
- Objectives are discussed before being selected
- There is increased motivation and job satisfaction
- Relationships between the managers and those under them improve
- There is better communication within the organization and increased coordination
- Objectives can be set individually for each department
- MBO can be applied in any organization
But there are disadvantages in MBO:
- It has to be systematically done
- There might be more importance given to the setting of the goals than on the course of action or actual outcome
- Quality of goals set may be poor or unrealistic
- It can be time-consuming to implement and difficult to maintain (but computers speed up the process)
- It might not be easy to identify all the objectives
Nonetheless, a well-designed LMGO plan and implementation in a surface warship will maximise the ship’s effectiveness and readiness. The key to success is the CO’s dedicated leadership and creating a professional command climate in the ship.
PART III
A NEW LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT APPROACH
I assumed command of NAVCOMMSTA BALBOA in the Panama Canal Zone in December 1973. Our most important operational commitment was to annually provide 5 months of ship-shore-ship communications support to the Atlantic Fleet’s UNITAS 4-ship task force as it transited around South America and operated with each South American Navy fleet. NCS Balboa had to be ready by the end of July. But we were not ready when I became the CO in December 1973.
In January 1974, my personal schedule through October required my visits to all 9 South America nations’ naval communications headquarters; serving on our CNO’s delegation to the Inter-American Chiefs of Navy conference in Argentina; a 4-day administrative and technical inspection of U.S. NAVCOMMUNIT RIO at Brazilian Navy Headquarters in Rio de Janerio; visits to the Dominican Republic and Washington, DC and participation in an Inter-American Naval Communications Conference at San Diego hosted by my boss RADM Jon Boyes. Commander, U.S. Naval Telecommunications Command.
I would be away from my command for over 4 months—one fourth of the fiscal year. My turn-over assessment of NCS Balboa had identified several major readiness issues that required prompt corrective action and reports to the admiral. Otherwise, NCS Balboa’s readiness would continue to deteriorate to one option: crises management with drastic measures. The situation was clearly a major command leadership and management challenge for me.
I met with the XO, department heads and chiefs to scope out actions required to resolve NCS Balboa’s ship-shore-ship communications systems technical problems; technical issues in the new transmitter building (heat); over 6 months lag in delivery of repaired modules and parts for the new suite of 42 HF transmitters, transmitting and receiving antenna farms, and an upgraded receiver site; restore a dysfunctional logistic support system clogged with long-overdue repair parts and modules; initiate urgent construction projects for additional enlisted women berthing facilities; and other priority issues. I concluded that a “business as usual” command leadership approach was not the answer.
To keep NCS Balboa on track and improving its readiness during my absences on travel, I decided to create a command management action plan and have it in place and operational prior to my departure. As a SWO, I had never created one, but necessity is the mother of invention. Under my leadership, the XO and heads of department created a command management tool: an action plan using goals and objectives to focus our work force on prioritized readiness deficiencies with milestones to track readiness improvement progress and deadlines.
This was my first venture into the domain of management by goals, objectives and milestones. The command action plan (CAP) became my leadership and management standard of performance during my command tour and the key to my success at NCS Balboa.
A NEW LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT APPROACH
I assumed command of NAVCOMMSTA BALBOA in the Panama Canal Zone in December 1973. Our most important operational commitment was to annually provide 5 months of ship-shore-ship communications support to the Atlantic Fleet’s UNITAS 4-ship task force as it transited around South America and operated with each South American Navy fleet. NCS Balboa had to be ready by the end of July. But we were not ready when I became the CO in December 1973.
In January 1974, my personal schedule through October required my visits to all 9 South America nations’ naval communications headquarters; serving on our CNO’s delegation to the Inter-American Chiefs of Navy conference in Argentina; a 4-day administrative and technical inspection of U.S. NAVCOMMUNIT RIO at Brazilian Navy Headquarters in Rio de Janerio; visits to the Dominican Republic and Washington, DC and participation in an Inter-American Naval Communications Conference at San Diego hosted by my boss RADM Jon Boyes. Commander, U.S. Naval Telecommunications Command.
I would be away from my command for over 4 months—one fourth of the fiscal year. My turn-over assessment of NCS Balboa had identified several major readiness issues that required prompt corrective action and reports to the admiral. Otherwise, NCS Balboa’s readiness would continue to deteriorate to one option: crises management with drastic measures. The situation was clearly a major command leadership and management challenge for me.
I met with the XO, department heads and chiefs to scope out actions required to resolve NCS Balboa’s ship-shore-ship communications systems technical problems; technical issues in the new transmitter building (heat); over 6 months lag in delivery of repaired modules and parts for the new suite of 42 HF transmitters, transmitting and receiving antenna farms, and an upgraded receiver site; restore a dysfunctional logistic support system clogged with long-overdue repair parts and modules; initiate urgent construction projects for additional enlisted women berthing facilities; and other priority issues. I concluded that a “business as usual” command leadership approach was not the answer.
To keep NCS Balboa on track and improving its readiness during my absences on travel, I decided to create a command management action plan and have it in place and operational prior to my departure. As a SWO, I had never created one, but necessity is the mother of invention. Under my leadership, the XO and heads of department created a command management tool: an action plan using goals and objectives to focus our work force on prioritized readiness deficiencies with milestones to track readiness improvement progress and deadlines.
This was my first venture into the domain of management by goals, objectives and milestones. The command action plan (CAP) became my leadership and management standard of performance during my command tour and the key to my success at NCS Balboa.
PART IV
PROSPECTIVE COMMANDING OFFICER (PCO)
When the Bureau of Naval Personnel issues orders to a SWO to command a surface warship and designates him or her as a Prospective Commanding Officer (PCO), the PCO must promptly initiate his or her planning for a successful command tour. Enroute to their prospective command, PCOs get several weeks of training, indoctrination and grooming. They must make use of their “scraps of time” to think about and reflect on their forthcoming burdens of command and how they are going to meet their command challenges, which will come.
To be comfortable and effective with LMGO, COs:
The most favorable situation for LMGO implementation in a surface warship is to begin the command tour with a shipyard overhaul. The ship will not be underway for weeks on end so the planning time is available for the PCO/CO and the command team to formulate and implement LMGO.
Due to the level of detail and the effort required from Ships Company, the CO must dedicate his or her’s total attention and involvement in LMGO. Because they best understand their desired command tour outcomes, COs must lead the command team—CO, XO, department heads, division officers, chiefs and LPOs—in formulating the command’s annual fiscal year goals.
FORT FISHER entered a shipyard dry-dock the night before I assumed command. We would be in shipyard overhaul during my first 7 months as CO, which provided me sufficient time to plan, create and implement my technique. But keep in mind that the technique is not used in the fleet nor taught in the SW Schools Command. The CO is therefore the expert and must train the officers, chiefs and LPOs how to create, implement and use the technique.
In retrospect, I should also have created an LMGO Council consisting of 2 division officers, 2 division chiefs, 2 division LPOs, the command master chief and headed by the operations officer. All departments would be represented on the council. The council would report to the Executive Officer. Its purpose would be to assist Ship’s Company in their LMGO mission execution provide training and continuity to the program.
PROSPECTIVE COMMANDING OFFICER (PCO)
When the Bureau of Naval Personnel issues orders to a SWO to command a surface warship and designates him or her as a Prospective Commanding Officer (PCO), the PCO must promptly initiate his or her planning for a successful command tour. Enroute to their prospective command, PCOs get several weeks of training, indoctrination and grooming. They must make use of their “scraps of time” to think about and reflect on their forthcoming burdens of command and how they are going to meet their command challenges, which will come.
To be comfortable and effective with LMGO, COs:
- must know themselves;
- know their strengths and weaknesses;
- understand their character, personality and temperament;
- know their talents and capabilities;
- understand how they best relate to their subordinates;
- know if he or she prefers to be in the middle of things or like working mostly by themselves and delegating to the XO and department heads;
- know how they perform under pressure and stress;
- and understand how they make decisions.
The most favorable situation for LMGO implementation in a surface warship is to begin the command tour with a shipyard overhaul. The ship will not be underway for weeks on end so the planning time is available for the PCO/CO and the command team to formulate and implement LMGO.
Due to the level of detail and the effort required from Ships Company, the CO must dedicate his or her’s total attention and involvement in LMGO. Because they best understand their desired command tour outcomes, COs must lead the command team—CO, XO, department heads, division officers, chiefs and LPOs—in formulating the command’s annual fiscal year goals.
FORT FISHER entered a shipyard dry-dock the night before I assumed command. We would be in shipyard overhaul during my first 7 months as CO, which provided me sufficient time to plan, create and implement my technique. But keep in mind that the technique is not used in the fleet nor taught in the SW Schools Command. The CO is therefore the expert and must train the officers, chiefs and LPOs how to create, implement and use the technique.
In retrospect, I should also have created an LMGO Council consisting of 2 division officers, 2 division chiefs, 2 division LPOs, the command master chief and headed by the operations officer. All departments would be represented on the council. The council would report to the Executive Officer. Its purpose would be to assist Ship’s Company in their LMGO mission execution provide training and continuity to the program.
PART V
COMMAND CLIMATE
To establish an effective LMGO technique in a surface warship, the ship must have a professional command climate. It is the foundation of the goals and objectives leadership and management technique; its importance cannot be over-emphasized. The CO is directly responsible for creating and maintaining an effective command climate in his or her warship. And it requires the dynamic support of the Ship’s Company leadership team: all officers, chief petty officers and petty officers.
A warship’s command climate is created through command policies that establish standards for crew performance of duty and conduct—the command corporate culture. It directly impacts each crew member’s morale and motivation. And the command climate’s tenor and tone are accurate predictors of crew performance, especially in critical events and in times of great stress.
Five months into my command of FORT FISHER, I wrote the following memorandum of policy on my desired command climate to all my officers, chiefs and first class petty officers:
“. . . Command climate is the sum of all shipboard human interactions, both formal and informal. The formal, professional climate must always be supportive of good order, discipline and morale. The professional conduct of the officers, chief petty officers and first class petty officers sets the tone for the whole ship, directly influencing the morale, attitude and motivation of the lower ratings. Furthermore, the conduct—specifically the leadership, management and supervisory actions—of the officers, chiefs and first class must be generally consistent on a ship-wide basis in order to enhance command unity, strengthen the chain of command, and support crew morale. Accordingly, the following rules shall be observed by all officers, chiefs and first class petty officers. For simplification, they are grouped into two categories, do and don’t:
DO:
DON’T:
Heads of Department shall indoctrinate their officers, chief petty officers and first class petty officers in the above rules and ensure compliance.”
I discussed the memo with all newly-reporting officers, chiefs and first class petty officers and gave them a copy to ensure their understanding of my policy. To personnel being transferred or leaving the Navy, during their departure meeting with me I would ask them “If you received orders sending you back to FORT FISHER, what you would like to be different here and why?” I received great feedback.
COMMAND CLIMATE
To establish an effective LMGO technique in a surface warship, the ship must have a professional command climate. It is the foundation of the goals and objectives leadership and management technique; its importance cannot be over-emphasized. The CO is directly responsible for creating and maintaining an effective command climate in his or her warship. And it requires the dynamic support of the Ship’s Company leadership team: all officers, chief petty officers and petty officers.
A warship’s command climate is created through command policies that establish standards for crew performance of duty and conduct—the command corporate culture. It directly impacts each crew member’s morale and motivation. And the command climate’s tenor and tone are accurate predictors of crew performance, especially in critical events and in times of great stress.
Five months into my command of FORT FISHER, I wrote the following memorandum of policy on my desired command climate to all my officers, chiefs and first class petty officers:
“. . . Command climate is the sum of all shipboard human interactions, both formal and informal. The formal, professional climate must always be supportive of good order, discipline and morale. The professional conduct of the officers, chief petty officers and first class petty officers sets the tone for the whole ship, directly influencing the morale, attitude and motivation of the lower ratings. Furthermore, the conduct—specifically the leadership, management and supervisory actions—of the officers, chiefs and first class must be generally consistent on a ship-wide basis in order to enhance command unity, strengthen the chain of command, and support crew morale. Accordingly, the following rules shall be observed by all officers, chiefs and first class petty officers. For simplification, they are grouped into two categories, do and don’t:
DO:
- Treat each person with courtesy and respect.
- Treat each person equitably regardless of race, ethnicity, color, sex or religion.
- Address each person by his name; Use rank/rate as appropriate.
- Be positive in your thinking and in your conversations.
- Enjoy your work; be enthusiastic.
- Regulate the work of each person working for you; determine a start and a completion time; allow time for coffee/soft drink; head call breaks; consider other interruptions.
- Insure that each person working for you knows and understands what he/she is supposed to accomplish.
- Strive to build the confidence of each person working for you.
- Strive to build a bond of mutual trust with each person you work for, you work with and each who works for you.
- Take time to counsel each person working for you. If they are doing well, tell them so. If you see shortcomings emerging, or he or she is not measuring up to your expectations, tell them so, and early on so that they have the opportunity to take corrective action.
- Be observant. Know what is going on among the people who are working for you.
- Get feedback. Keep the loop closed.
- Use common sense.
- Be available.
- Keep your word.
- Do something considerate each day for each person working for you.
DON’T:
- Don’t use first names between officers and chiefs, or between officers and E- 6 and below.
- Don’t use first names between chiefs and E-6 and below.
- Never say anything derogatory about an officer, chief or first class petty officer in public, especially in front of juniors.
- Never use derogatory names or phrases when addressing a person, even if meant in jest.
- Never threaten a person. Tell him or her what you want and expect from them.
- Never attempt to get revenge. You can’t get even.
- Never allow illegal or wrongful conduct by juniors, aboard or ashore, to go without admonishment or some kind of corrective action.
- Don’t permit obscene/vulgar language in public, especially on or in the vicinity of the quarterdeck.
- Never let a person think you have given up hope in him or her.
Heads of Department shall indoctrinate their officers, chief petty officers and first class petty officers in the above rules and ensure compliance.”
I discussed the memo with all newly-reporting officers, chiefs and first class petty officers and gave them a copy to ensure their understanding of my policy. To personnel being transferred or leaving the Navy, during their departure meeting with me I would ask them “If you received orders sending you back to FORT FISHER, what you would like to be different here and why?” I received great feedback.
PART VI
CREATING AND IMPLEMENTING LMGO: 3 PHASES
Phase 1 begins when a SWO becomes a PCO and begins thinking, contemplating and reflecting about his or her personal readiness to command a surface warship.
First, the PCO studies the warship’s mission until able to articulate it without notes. Next is the analysis of the warship’s employment schedule for the PCO’s entire command tour, which identifies the major employment events that the PCO will face—the challenges.
The PCO then proceeds to draft the single most important directive of his or her command tour: a memorandum of policy and guidance for creating and implementing the LMGO technique in his or her warship. Here are the memo’s prioritized components:
Having accomplished the essential preliminary work before he or she takes their first step onto their prospective command’s quarterdeck, the PCO will assume command with a draft of his or her LMBO directive that will be finalized with the XO when Ships Company turns-to on a normal working day after the ceremonial aspects of the change of command are history.
To adapt LMGO to a surface warship, I began by developing definitions. My criterion was simplicity:
Tasks and milestones are created by Division-level management (division officer, chief and LPO) under the direction of their respective head of department. The division leadership team scopes the required work, proper sequencing with other tasks within the same objective; manpower, tools and materials; if needed, support from outside organizations for maintenance, repair and training; number of days for task completion; (include funding only if needed). When all its tasks are completed, an objective is accomplished. Here are examples of a surface warship goal, objectives, task and milestones within the LMGO.
Goal 1: To be the best ship in PHIBRON THREE (win the E) for fiscal year 2018
Objective 1.1 To achieve the top grades in all squadron ship annual PHIBRON THREE “E” competition exercises and inspections.
Milestone 1.1: NLT 30 September 2018
Task 1.1.1: To inspect all ship’s boats and landing craft and correct all discrepancies
Milestone 1.1.1: NLT 8/31/2018
Objective 1.2: To inspect all 5” gun turret operating systems and gun systems and perform all required maintenance and repairs.
Milestone 1.2.1: NLT 7/31/2018
Task 1.2.1: To scope and conduct the required inspections and maintenance.
Milestone 1.2.1: NLT 6/31/2018
It may seem counter-intuitive, but the LMGO plan development and execution do not entail a heavy burden of bureaucracy or paperwork. I tried to avoid excessive detail and to keep it simple. Department heads know their respective readiness requirements and the chiefs and LPOs have hands-on experience in creating and accomplishing shipboard tasks.
Common sense should guide plan development and execution. Do not waste your team’s time trying to get things perfect. Objectives and tasks—even goals—can be refined during plan execution. Time should be allowed for the officers, chiefs and LPO’s—the command leadership team—learning curve and to get comfortable with the technique, but the show must get on the road as quickly as possible.
With his or her command LMGO directive in hand, the CO convenes a department head meeting and promulgates the directive. The department heads and the XO must have a good understanding of the work to be accomplished by the team and the issues to be resolved. After the meeting, the XO will coordinate the department heads’ one-on-one meetings with the CO to finalize command goals and to create at least 2-3 departmental supporting objectives for each command goal. For practical reasons the plan should be limited to about 10 goals per fiscal year.
The departmental objectives incorporate the respective readiness requirements, including the accomplishment of all pre-deployment underway training exercises such as along-side refuelling at night or in periods of restricted visibility; weapons firing exercises; material and administrative inspections; restricted availabilities incorporating all required upkeep and maintenance; and work-up for deployment if scheduled during the current fiscal year or following.
After the CO approves their respective departmental objectives, department heads will direct their division officers in creating the implementing tasks—about 1-2 per objective. This will require the combination of several distinctive steps into one overarching task. Keep it simple. Division chiefs and LPOs contribute their professional “running the ship” know-how. This phase indoctrinates the officers, chiefs and LPOs in the goals, objectives, tasks and milestones creation methodology that is essential for successful plan development and execution.
Phase 2. All the necessary technique components that have been created are connected and made ready for implementation. The operations officer leads the effort and coordinates with the entire command leadership team as necessary. The operations officer is the plan custodian and maintains the master list of goals, objectives and tasks; tracks progress; coordinates resolution of issues; records completion of each task and objective and the achievement of each goal.
Phase 3. This critical activity consists of a “Murder Board” created by the CO, led by the XO and includes 8-10 officers, chiefs and LPOs and command master chief. Its purpose is to find vulnerabilities in the goals, objectives, tasks and milestones that will negatively impact the overall LMGO outcome if they are not accomplished on schedule.
After evaluating the Murder Boat report, the CO should be ready to decide on the technique go/no go. But he or she’s LMGO implementation decision cannot be “by seat of the pants.” And keep in mind the Carpenter’s Rule: “Measure Twice, Cut Once!” It can serve as the CO’s final gut-check before he or she casts the die with a decision based on Ship’s Company consensus and the CO’s best judgement.
Implementation of the LMGO technique is initiated by the CO in a mess decks meeting of the command’s leadership team. Looking them in the eye and speaking in straightforward deck-plate terminology, the CO explains the desired command climate and expected Ships Company mission performance. He or she describes each command goal and the responsibilities of the officers, chiefs, and LPOs in creating the desired command climate and accomplishing their respective objectives and tasks.
And then the command leadership team proceeds to execution. Progress is reported to the CO by the XO and department heads, but briefings should not be a paperwork drill.
The CO periodically reviews the plan documentation with the operations officer and provides additional guidance as necessary. Ships Company focus on goals, objectives and tasks is maintained through periodic briefings to the command leadership team by the CO and department heads, Plan of the Day notes, ship’s newspaper articles, and by displays of the command goals (but not the objectives or tasks) on bulletin boards throughout the ship.
CREATING AND IMPLEMENTING LMGO: 3 PHASES
Phase 1 begins when a SWO becomes a PCO and begins thinking, contemplating and reflecting about his or her personal readiness to command a surface warship.
First, the PCO studies the warship’s mission until able to articulate it without notes. Next is the analysis of the warship’s employment schedule for the PCO’s entire command tour, which identifies the major employment events that the PCO will face—the challenges.
The PCO then proceeds to draft the single most important directive of his or her command tour: a memorandum of policy and guidance for creating and implementing the LMGO technique in his or her warship. Here are the memo’s prioritized components:
- One-paragraph description of the warship’s mission
- One-paragraph description of the PCO’s desired command climate
- One-paragraph statement of the PCO’s vision of his or her warship’s mission performance
- Major challenges facing the command in the current fiscal year
- PCO’s draft of a prioritized list of command mission-oriented goals for the current fiscal year (to be finalized in coordination with the command leadership team)
- Guidance for development of departmental supporting objectives and implementing tasks and milestones for each command goal
- Plan implementation milestones
- Department heads’ progress reports
- Plan publicity
- Operations officer’s responsibilities as plan custodian
Having accomplished the essential preliminary work before he or she takes their first step onto their prospective command’s quarterdeck, the PCO will assume command with a draft of his or her LMBO directive that will be finalized with the XO when Ships Company turns-to on a normal working day after the ceremonial aspects of the change of command are history.
To adapt LMGO to a surface warship, I began by developing definitions. My criterion was simplicity:
- Goal. A goal is a mission-related event to be accomplished within a discrete timeframe (The “how” and “when” of goal accomplishment are not specified in the goal statement.)
- Objective (target). An objective is an essential step or activity in the goal achievement process. A goal statement must be broken down into several interrelated and supporting objectives; the number is dependent on the complexity of the goal. The goal is achieved when all its objectives are accomplished.
- Task. Each objective is broken down into 2 or more complete units of work organized into a structure of jobs to be accomplished. These units of work are called tasks.
- Milestone. Deadline date for accomplishment of a goal, an objective or a task, or a critical event or step in each objective and task.
Tasks and milestones are created by Division-level management (division officer, chief and LPO) under the direction of their respective head of department. The division leadership team scopes the required work, proper sequencing with other tasks within the same objective; manpower, tools and materials; if needed, support from outside organizations for maintenance, repair and training; number of days for task completion; (include funding only if needed). When all its tasks are completed, an objective is accomplished. Here are examples of a surface warship goal, objectives, task and milestones within the LMGO.
Goal 1: To be the best ship in PHIBRON THREE (win the E) for fiscal year 2018
Objective 1.1 To achieve the top grades in all squadron ship annual PHIBRON THREE “E” competition exercises and inspections.
Milestone 1.1: NLT 30 September 2018
Task 1.1.1: To inspect all ship’s boats and landing craft and correct all discrepancies
Milestone 1.1.1: NLT 8/31/2018
Objective 1.2: To inspect all 5” gun turret operating systems and gun systems and perform all required maintenance and repairs.
Milestone 1.2.1: NLT 7/31/2018
Task 1.2.1: To scope and conduct the required inspections and maintenance.
Milestone 1.2.1: NLT 6/31/2018
It may seem counter-intuitive, but the LMGO plan development and execution do not entail a heavy burden of bureaucracy or paperwork. I tried to avoid excessive detail and to keep it simple. Department heads know their respective readiness requirements and the chiefs and LPOs have hands-on experience in creating and accomplishing shipboard tasks.
Common sense should guide plan development and execution. Do not waste your team’s time trying to get things perfect. Objectives and tasks—even goals—can be refined during plan execution. Time should be allowed for the officers, chiefs and LPO’s—the command leadership team—learning curve and to get comfortable with the technique, but the show must get on the road as quickly as possible.
With his or her command LMGO directive in hand, the CO convenes a department head meeting and promulgates the directive. The department heads and the XO must have a good understanding of the work to be accomplished by the team and the issues to be resolved. After the meeting, the XO will coordinate the department heads’ one-on-one meetings with the CO to finalize command goals and to create at least 2-3 departmental supporting objectives for each command goal. For practical reasons the plan should be limited to about 10 goals per fiscal year.
The departmental objectives incorporate the respective readiness requirements, including the accomplishment of all pre-deployment underway training exercises such as along-side refuelling at night or in periods of restricted visibility; weapons firing exercises; material and administrative inspections; restricted availabilities incorporating all required upkeep and maintenance; and work-up for deployment if scheduled during the current fiscal year or following.
After the CO approves their respective departmental objectives, department heads will direct their division officers in creating the implementing tasks—about 1-2 per objective. This will require the combination of several distinctive steps into one overarching task. Keep it simple. Division chiefs and LPOs contribute their professional “running the ship” know-how. This phase indoctrinates the officers, chiefs and LPOs in the goals, objectives, tasks and milestones creation methodology that is essential for successful plan development and execution.
Phase 2. All the necessary technique components that have been created are connected and made ready for implementation. The operations officer leads the effort and coordinates with the entire command leadership team as necessary. The operations officer is the plan custodian and maintains the master list of goals, objectives and tasks; tracks progress; coordinates resolution of issues; records completion of each task and objective and the achievement of each goal.
Phase 3. This critical activity consists of a “Murder Board” created by the CO, led by the XO and includes 8-10 officers, chiefs and LPOs and command master chief. Its purpose is to find vulnerabilities in the goals, objectives, tasks and milestones that will negatively impact the overall LMGO outcome if they are not accomplished on schedule.
After evaluating the Murder Boat report, the CO should be ready to decide on the technique go/no go. But he or she’s LMGO implementation decision cannot be “by seat of the pants.” And keep in mind the Carpenter’s Rule: “Measure Twice, Cut Once!” It can serve as the CO’s final gut-check before he or she casts the die with a decision based on Ship’s Company consensus and the CO’s best judgement.
Implementation of the LMGO technique is initiated by the CO in a mess decks meeting of the command’s leadership team. Looking them in the eye and speaking in straightforward deck-plate terminology, the CO explains the desired command climate and expected Ships Company mission performance. He or she describes each command goal and the responsibilities of the officers, chiefs, and LPOs in creating the desired command climate and accomplishing their respective objectives and tasks.
And then the command leadership team proceeds to execution. Progress is reported to the CO by the XO and department heads, but briefings should not be a paperwork drill.
The CO periodically reviews the plan documentation with the operations officer and provides additional guidance as necessary. Ships Company focus on goals, objectives and tasks is maintained through periodic briefings to the command leadership team by the CO and department heads, Plan of the Day notes, ship’s newspaper articles, and by displays of the command goals (but not the objectives or tasks) on bulletin boards throughout the ship.
PART VII
HOW THE MAGIC W0RKS
USS FORT FISHER (LSD 40)
I assumed command the day after FORT FISHER entered Todd Division Shipyard dry-dock in Long Beach. My main desire was to create a command climate that would foster great teamwork, professionalism and high morale. And I envisioned that FORT FISHER would meet all its schedule and mission challenges successfully.
FORT FISHER’S mission was primary control ship (PCS) in an amphibious task force surface and vertical (air) assault on a hostile beach. She organized and conducted the ship-to-shore movement of landing craft and Marine amphibious tracked vehicles combat loaded with Marines and light weapons from the anchored amphibious task group ships. She directed the landing craft waves to the boat lane line of departure. When signalled, the PCS directs the waves within a designated boat lane to touch down on the landing beach at H-Hour. The LSD embarked 300 Marines with their weapons, gear and supplies; Marine Corps armoured personnel assault vehicles, medium tanks, light and heavy artillery, light weapons and wheeled vehicles. Her flight deck could operate and refuel with all classes of Marine and Navy helos. Her enormous well deck transported naval landing craft and provided boat haven repair services while anchored.
My analysis of our first fiscal year employment schedule convinced me that FORT FISHER was already in a crises management mode even before I set foot on the quarterdeck. Here are the challenges I faced:
After departing the shipyard, FORT FISHER’S operations schedule consisted primarily of an intense workup for deployment that was so foreshortened and compressed that it was almost insane for me to even attempt to accomplish the milestones. We had from mid-June to the second week in September (less than 3 months) to accomplish all required training, work-up and inspections for deployment.
But fortunately, in the shipyard I had time to think about how I was going to successfully accomplish my command responsibilities and deploy my ship on schedule with AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON FIVE.
I began the LMGO planning by re-organizing the ship’s overhaul management team. I assigned the engineering plant light-off examination (LOE) to the Chief Engineer (Cheng) and made the Operations Officer the overhaul manager (he had done it before). I designated myself, the XO and the department heads as the overhaul management team.
My first-year LMGO leadership and management technique plan had a single goal: to deploy on time with our squadron. All overhaul jobs became departmental tasks assigned to either the shipyard or ship’s force. The LOE, underway training, and inspection events became tasks managed by the XO in our Planning Board for Training (PBFT). We formulated five supporting objectives and tracked progress in our weekly overhaul and bi-weekly PBFT meetings. Objectives:
After topping off all our fuel tanks and victualling, we sortied for Subic Bay with a 24 hour stop at Eniwetok for lift cargo offload. Our independent voyage required 17 days. It was a bit lonely, sighting our first merchantman as she sailed out of San Bernardino Straits. We arrived at Subic Bay on schedule and began earning our pay in Seventh Fleet.
I launched my second-year LMGO plan while we were on deployment in 7th Fleet. I extended the plan to the end of the calendar year to coincide with the end of my tour. I created 10 goals:
Here are our first year results:
USS VANCOUVER (LPD 2)
I assumed command of VANCOUVER in February 1981 at her home port San Diego. Two weeks later, she entered a San Diego civilian shipyard to conduct an 11 month overhaul estimated to cost $21 M. The overhaul would be hard work and lots of inconvenience, but if completed ship’s force jobs on schedule and kept the contractor on track, my Ship’s Company could successfully meet the challenge.
My major concern was the requirement to berth all single crew members in designated rooms in the Grant Hotel for six months while the ship’s sewage and galley waste systems were removed and replaced by an environmentally closed system. The hotel was scheduled for a major modernization in a year; it was totally empty except for all its normal hotel office, lobby and individual room furniture. The hotel is located in the middle of the city and is a popular area for tourists and sailors. The Vice Admiral who commanded the Naval Surface Force Pacific Fleet and was funding the overhaul, issued guidance to me that I was to take measures to ensure that VANCOUVER’S crew behaved themselves and did not have any incidents that would end up in the media. (We had no incidents.)
I had the XO create a watch organization in the hotel that would maintain good order and discipline 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. We also had to manage bus schedules of buses provided to shuttle our crew to and from the ship for work and to and from the ship to the base cafeterias. And of course we had to maintain a shipboard watch bill at the same time.
The situation had a significant impact on work force stability; and it conflicted the overhaul work of all the departments’ junior officers, chiefs and 1st and 2nd petty officers, who were also assigned to duty in our hotel watch bill.
Accordingly, in VANCOUVER I minimized my employment of LMGO by simply overlaying our goals and objectives on our refresher training requirements, our amphibious warfare training requirements and our work-up for deployment. My plan had 5 goals:
All goals were successfully accomplished. Because of her superior performance in training—with excellence in damage control in particular; command climate and Ship’s Company spirit, Fleet Training Group released the Van-Can-Do from scheduled training two days early and commended her for readiness for forward deployment. She led the Pacific Fleet Amphibious Force in first-term and career re-enlistments. And she deployed on time.
PHIBRON THREE
I assumed command of AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON THREE in homeport San Diego in November 1982. I did not use LMGO in my first year because I deployed the squadron only 2 months after breaking my pennant in NEW ORLEANS. In my second year, I faced another formidable challenge: to deploy the squadron to 7th Fleet only 10 months after completion of our previous deployment. The amphibious force deployment turn-around norm was 15-18 months. Our deployment would coincide with a carrier battle group deployment to 7th Fleet “Just like we did in WW II.” I created an LMBO plan based on only 2 goals:
For supporting objectives, my staff and I created a success-oriented training, operations, maintenance and deployment work-up schedule that included a port visit to Puerto Vallarta or Mazatlán or Acapulco in Mexico with underway training to and from the ports for each of our 7 ships.
The ships treated their respective work-up schedule events as objectives, and then created their tasks as necessary to accomplish each objective. Ship reports of task and objective accomplishments were submitted to and tracked by my staff officer having cognizance. Simple and effective. Competition developed among the squadron ships on who would complete the fastest. Both goals were successfully accomplished. VANCOUVER sortied on time with the highest readiness of any deploying amphibious squadron in the previous 2 fiscal years.
HOW THE MAGIC W0RKS
USS FORT FISHER (LSD 40)
I assumed command the day after FORT FISHER entered Todd Division Shipyard dry-dock in Long Beach. My main desire was to create a command climate that would foster great teamwork, professionalism and high morale. And I envisioned that FORT FISHER would meet all its schedule and mission challenges successfully.
FORT FISHER’S mission was primary control ship (PCS) in an amphibious task force surface and vertical (air) assault on a hostile beach. She organized and conducted the ship-to-shore movement of landing craft and Marine amphibious tracked vehicles combat loaded with Marines and light weapons from the anchored amphibious task group ships. She directed the landing craft waves to the boat lane line of departure. When signalled, the PCS directs the waves within a designated boat lane to touch down on the landing beach at H-Hour. The LSD embarked 300 Marines with their weapons, gear and supplies; Marine Corps armoured personnel assault vehicles, medium tanks, light and heavy artillery, light weapons and wheeled vehicles. Her flight deck could operate and refuel with all classes of Marine and Navy helos. Her enormous well deck transported naval landing craft and provided boat haven repair services while anchored.
My analysis of our first fiscal year employment schedule convinced me that FORT FISHER was already in a crises management mode even before I set foot on the quarterdeck. Here are the challenges I faced:
- Complete a 9-month overhaul in Long Beach (home port San Diego) that was behind schedule in main propulsion contractor and ship’s force jobs because of delays in funding approval of the entire work package
- Complete overhaul two weeks early if possible (no Pacific Fleet ship had done so in recent history)
- Conduct a one-week post-overhaul shakedown
- Accomplish all required underway refresher and amphibious warfare training exercises in work-up to deployment to 7th Fleet
- Deploy to 7th Fleet with PHIBRON FIVE only 3 months after completing the overhaul (the norm for amphibious warship post-overhaul initiation of pre-deployment preparation was 9 months)
- Conduct a huge, maximum lift of Corps of Engineers wheeled and tracked construction vehicles including graders, back hoes, cement plants, cement trucks, gasoline trucks, water tankers, cranes and associated spare parts and ancillary equipment to Eniwetok (the load was the largest amphibious lift since the end of the Vietnam war; it completely filled FORT FISHER’S well deck, mezzanine deck and flight deck).
After departing the shipyard, FORT FISHER’S operations schedule consisted primarily of an intense workup for deployment that was so foreshortened and compressed that it was almost insane for me to even attempt to accomplish the milestones. We had from mid-June to the second week in September (less than 3 months) to accomplish all required training, work-up and inspections for deployment.
But fortunately, in the shipyard I had time to think about how I was going to successfully accomplish my command responsibilities and deploy my ship on schedule with AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON FIVE.
I began the LMGO planning by re-organizing the ship’s overhaul management team. I assigned the engineering plant light-off examination (LOE) to the Chief Engineer (Cheng) and made the Operations Officer the overhaul manager (he had done it before). I designated myself, the XO and the department heads as the overhaul management team.
My first-year LMGO leadership and management technique plan had a single goal: to deploy on time with our squadron. All overhaul jobs became departmental tasks assigned to either the shipyard or ship’s force. The LOE, underway training, and inspection events became tasks managed by the XO in our Planning Board for Training (PBFT). We formulated five supporting objectives and tracked progress in our weekly overhaul and bi-weekly PBFT meetings. Objectives:
- Pass the LOE as scheduled during overhaul;
- Complete the overhaul at least two weeks ahead of schedule in top material condition (we departed Todd Shipyard 17 days ahead of schedule);
- Successfully conduct all underway refresher training and amphibious warfare training requirements;
- Pass 17 pre-deployment inspections, including command administrative inspections.
- Pass the operational propulsion examination (OPPE). Due to schedule conflicts, state of steam propulsion engineering personnel training, and insufficient time, the OPPE was postponed and conducted enroute to Pearl Harbor in company with PHIBRON 5. We failed and were assigned one week of high priority upkeep at the Pearl Harbor naval shipyard for correction of all OPPE-related engineering plant deficiencies.
- We then accomplished 7 days of underway propulsion plant casualty control training in the local op area. And then we passed the OPPE, a 2-day event. Our Type Commander gave us the weekend off in Pearl and the entire crew enjoyed beach parties with luaus.
After topping off all our fuel tanks and victualling, we sortied for Subic Bay with a 24 hour stop at Eniwetok for lift cargo offload. Our independent voyage required 17 days. It was a bit lonely, sighting our first merchantman as she sailed out of San Bernardino Straits. We arrived at Subic Bay on schedule and began earning our pay in Seventh Fleet.
I launched my second-year LMGO plan while we were on deployment in 7th Fleet. I extended the plan to the end of the calendar year to coincide with the end of my tour. I created 10 goals:
- Operate FORT FISHER in a safe manner with no serious personnel injuries or deaths;
- Accomplish every operational commitment in a professional, seamanlike manner;
- Maintain FORT FISHER in the highest possible state of material readiness within available resources;
- Create and sustain a high level of morale within FORT FISHER at every level of rank and rate;
- Ensure equal opportunity and fair treatment for All Hands;
- Achieve maximum professional growth in each person serving on board FORT FISHER;
- Achieve 60% first-term and 90% career reenlistment rates;
- Maintain FORT FISHER in a high state of cleanliness, sanitation, and material preservation;
- Contribute to a good public image of the U.S. Navy;
- Be the best ship in PHIBRON FIVE.
Here are our first year results:
- CTF 76 cited FORT FISHER as the best ship in his deployed amphibious task force;
- The 7th Fleet logistics task force commander commended FORT FISHER for best ship handling in 7th Fleet during underway alongside replenishments, particularly in foul weather and night-time refuelling;
- Met all operational commitments with no accidents, injuries or deaths;
- Welcomed back to freedom and provided humanitarian assistance to 3 young Americans and their yacht Brillig in the South China Sea following their release from a 3-month detention by Communist North Vietnam;
- Created a 5 working day shipboard petty officer academy with a chiefs and officer faculty to train new 3rd Class and 2nd Class Petty Officers;
- Led the Pacific Fleet Amphibious Force in first-term and career reenlistments;
- Because of her crew smartness and her clean, shipshape appearance, after returning from deployment FORT FISHER was twice selected as the Navy’s weekend San Diego Harbor public visit ship;
- Because of her high readiness, FORT FISHER was shifted to PHIBRON SEVEN, accomplished a ten-month turn-around, and deployed again to 7th Fleet.
USS VANCOUVER (LPD 2)
I assumed command of VANCOUVER in February 1981 at her home port San Diego. Two weeks later, she entered a San Diego civilian shipyard to conduct an 11 month overhaul estimated to cost $21 M. The overhaul would be hard work and lots of inconvenience, but if completed ship’s force jobs on schedule and kept the contractor on track, my Ship’s Company could successfully meet the challenge.
My major concern was the requirement to berth all single crew members in designated rooms in the Grant Hotel for six months while the ship’s sewage and galley waste systems were removed and replaced by an environmentally closed system. The hotel was scheduled for a major modernization in a year; it was totally empty except for all its normal hotel office, lobby and individual room furniture. The hotel is located in the middle of the city and is a popular area for tourists and sailors. The Vice Admiral who commanded the Naval Surface Force Pacific Fleet and was funding the overhaul, issued guidance to me that I was to take measures to ensure that VANCOUVER’S crew behaved themselves and did not have any incidents that would end up in the media. (We had no incidents.)
I had the XO create a watch organization in the hotel that would maintain good order and discipline 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. We also had to manage bus schedules of buses provided to shuttle our crew to and from the ship for work and to and from the ship to the base cafeterias. And of course we had to maintain a shipboard watch bill at the same time.
The situation had a significant impact on work force stability; and it conflicted the overhaul work of all the departments’ junior officers, chiefs and 1st and 2nd petty officers, who were also assigned to duty in our hotel watch bill.
Accordingly, in VANCOUVER I minimized my employment of LMGO by simply overlaying our goals and objectives on our refresher training requirements, our amphibious warfare training requirements and our work-up for deployment. My plan had 5 goals:
- Complete the overhaul on time in top material condition;
- Excel in all Fleet Training Group (FTG) damage control exercises, especially in the settings of damage control conditions Yoke and Zebra throughout the ship; and during the setting of, and securing from General Quarters;
- Excel in all FTG underway refresher training and amphibious warfare training exercises and drills;
- Excel in all pre-deployment inspections;
- Deploy on time to 7th Fleet.
All goals were successfully accomplished. Because of her superior performance in training—with excellence in damage control in particular; command climate and Ship’s Company spirit, Fleet Training Group released the Van-Can-Do from scheduled training two days early and commended her for readiness for forward deployment. She led the Pacific Fleet Amphibious Force in first-term and career re-enlistments. And she deployed on time.
PHIBRON THREE
I assumed command of AMPHIBIOUS SQUADRON THREE in homeport San Diego in November 1982. I did not use LMGO in my first year because I deployed the squadron only 2 months after breaking my pennant in NEW ORLEANS. In my second year, I faced another formidable challenge: to deploy the squadron to 7th Fleet only 10 months after completion of our previous deployment. The amphibious force deployment turn-around norm was 15-18 months. Our deployment would coincide with a carrier battle group deployment to 7th Fleet “Just like we did in WW II.” I created an LMBO plan based on only 2 goals:
- To accomplish the squadron deployment turn-around (TMTA) in 10 months;
- To provide a 30-day Prepare for Overseas Movement (POM) period for each ship in my squadron.
For supporting objectives, my staff and I created a success-oriented training, operations, maintenance and deployment work-up schedule that included a port visit to Puerto Vallarta or Mazatlán or Acapulco in Mexico with underway training to and from the ports for each of our 7 ships.
The ships treated their respective work-up schedule events as objectives, and then created their tasks as necessary to accomplish each objective. Ship reports of task and objective accomplishments were submitted to and tracked by my staff officer having cognizance. Simple and effective. Competition developed among the squadron ships on who would complete the fastest. Both goals were successfully accomplished. VANCOUVER sortied on time with the highest readiness of any deploying amphibious squadron in the previous 2 fiscal years.
PART V III
LMGO RESULTS
I employed LMGO successfully in FORT FISHER, VANCOUVER and PHIBRON THREE. I modified my concept as necessary to keep the whole 9 yards simple and flexible. The most complete application was in FORT FISHER.
The surface warship commanding officer’s technique for leadership and management by mission-oriented goals and objectives is a powerful command leadership approach
The technique also simplifies the identification of critical manpower shortages; training and logistical requirements; requirements for assistance from supporting commands; identification of critical spare parts and material requirements; and required funding augmentations.
The following outcomes demonstrate the very significant impact of the technique on Ships Company:
Perhaps the most valuable effect of the LMGO technique is that it fosters an informed, hardworking, enthusiastic and supportive Ships Company. The LMGO plan also provides clear guidance for performance of duty by the officers, chiefs and LPOs and focuses ships’ force work on LMGO plan tasks.
The main point of the technique is that the commanding officer can foster a vibrant, professional command climate with Ship’s Company interest, energy and enthusiasm. He will more than double his leadership opportunities within Ships Company. To accomplish this, the CO must motivate the Wardroom, the Chiefs’ Mess and the First Class Petty Officers and provide deck plate leadership in ship’s force task accomplishments as scheduled.
Command leadership and management by mission-based goals and objectives releases human potential, creates synergy and innovation and develops great teams. And it facilitates command recognition of meritorious performance by members of Ships’ Company.
To my knowledge, LMGO was not used in the fleet in my era and I doubt it is in use today. The technique is not taught at any level of instruction in the Surface Warfare Center schools command, but an earlier version of this paper was published in the Surface Navy Association’s SURFACE SITREP newspaper in 2016.
Because of the time the CO will need to bring the leadership team up to speed in LMGO and its development and implementation in his or her surface warship, I would recommend it only to a PCO who begins his or her command tour in a shipyard overhaul, which provides the extra time that is required for planning and implementing.
I am confident that every surface warship commanding officer who decides to employ the LMGO technique significantly enhances his or her odds for a successful command tour, but it requires the CO’s total involvement and an exquisite understanding of what he or she is trying to accomplish. Half-measures, inattention to plan execution and occasional cheerleading by the command leadership team will create the opposite effect.
I am eternally grateful to each of my crews for their loyalty, dedication to duty, hard work and skilful task accomplishment, which resulted in high readiness and superior mission performance by each of my three sea commands and one ashore.
LMGO RESULTS
I employed LMGO successfully in FORT FISHER, VANCOUVER and PHIBRON THREE. I modified my concept as necessary to keep the whole 9 yards simple and flexible. The most complete application was in FORT FISHER.
The surface warship commanding officer’s technique for leadership and management by mission-oriented goals and objectives is a powerful command leadership approach
- Creates top-level combat readiness;
- Facilitates mission and task accomplishment;
- Prioritizes command attention;
- Establishes a coherent framework for command policies; and
- Fosters Ships Company unity and high morale;
The technique also simplifies the identification of critical manpower shortages; training and logistical requirements; requirements for assistance from supporting commands; identification of critical spare parts and material requirements; and required funding augmentations.
The following outcomes demonstrate the very significant impact of the technique on Ships Company:
- All Hands will know and understand the CO’s desires, priorities and intentions;
- All Hands will understand what the CO expects from them.
Perhaps the most valuable effect of the LMGO technique is that it fosters an informed, hardworking, enthusiastic and supportive Ships Company. The LMGO plan also provides clear guidance for performance of duty by the officers, chiefs and LPOs and focuses ships’ force work on LMGO plan tasks.
The main point of the technique is that the commanding officer can foster a vibrant, professional command climate with Ship’s Company interest, energy and enthusiasm. He will more than double his leadership opportunities within Ships Company. To accomplish this, the CO must motivate the Wardroom, the Chiefs’ Mess and the First Class Petty Officers and provide deck plate leadership in ship’s force task accomplishments as scheduled.
Command leadership and management by mission-based goals and objectives releases human potential, creates synergy and innovation and develops great teams. And it facilitates command recognition of meritorious performance by members of Ships’ Company.
To my knowledge, LMGO was not used in the fleet in my era and I doubt it is in use today. The technique is not taught at any level of instruction in the Surface Warfare Center schools command, but an earlier version of this paper was published in the Surface Navy Association’s SURFACE SITREP newspaper in 2016.
Because of the time the CO will need to bring the leadership team up to speed in LMGO and its development and implementation in his or her surface warship, I would recommend it only to a PCO who begins his or her command tour in a shipyard overhaul, which provides the extra time that is required for planning and implementing.
I am confident that every surface warship commanding officer who decides to employ the LMGO technique significantly enhances his or her odds for a successful command tour, but it requires the CO’s total involvement and an exquisite understanding of what he or she is trying to accomplish. Half-measures, inattention to plan execution and occasional cheerleading by the command leadership team will create the opposite effect.
I am eternally grateful to each of my crews for their loyalty, dedication to duty, hard work and skilful task accomplishment, which resulted in high readiness and superior mission performance by each of my three sea commands and one ashore.